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Playing Hard-to-Get: Manipulating One’s Perceived Availability as a Mate
PETER K. JONASON1* and NORMAN P. LI2
1School of Social Sciences and Psychology, University of Western Sydney, Sydney, Australia
2School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, Singapore
Abstract: ‘Playing hard-to-get’ is a mating tactic in which people give the impression that they are ostensibly
uninterested to get others to desire them more. This topic has received little attention because of theoretical and
methodological limitations of prior work. We present four studies drawn from four different American universities
that examined playing hard-to-get as part of a supply-side economics model of dating. In Studies 1a (N= 100) and
1b (N= 491), we identified the tactics that characterize playing hard-to-get and how often men and women enact
them. In Study 2 (N= 290), we assessed reasons why men and women play hard-to-get along with the personality
traits associated with these reasons. In Studies 3 (N= 270) and 4 (N= 425), we manipulated the rate per week
prospective mates went out with people they had just met and assessed participants’ willingness to engage in casual
sex and serious romantic relationships with prospective mates (Study 3) and the money and time they were willing to
invest in prospective mates (Study 4). We frame our results using a sexual economics model to understand the role of
perceived availability in mating dynamics. Copyright © 2012 European Association of Personality Psychology
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Playing hard-to-get is a mating strategy that some people
adopt to alter the degree to which others find them desirable
as a mate (Bailey & Garrou, 1983; Eastwick, Finkel,
Mochon, & Ariely, 2007; Mathews, Rosenfield, & Stephan,
1979; Walster, Walster, Piliavin, & Schmidt, 1973; Wright
& Contrada, 1986). There is little consensus on what
‘playing hard-to-get’ is, whether it works, and if so, how
and why it works (Scott, 2009). We contend that this is
because of theoretical and methodological limitations in prior
work that preclude strong inference. In this study, we use an
evolutionary paradigm to update work on playing hard-to-get
across four studies assessing both actor (self-report studies)
and target effects (experimental studies). We examine how
individual differences in who plays hard-to-get and the effect
of being hard-to-get as a potential mate provides insights
consistent with the economic paradigms used in evolutionary
psychology. In so doing, we provide a coherent framework
to understand playing hard-to-get.
Theoretically, playing hard-to-get has been investigated
with proximate models (i.e., the how) versus ultimate models
(i.e., the why). For instance, playing hard-to-get effects have
been explained with the following: (i) ‘postdiction’ about
how men want women who are not available to others but
available to them (Walster et al., 1973, p. 120); (ii) reciprocal
liking (Eastwick et al., 2007); (iii) female participants being
told a male target liked her a lot or an average amount
(Whitchurch, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2011); and (iv) female
participants functioned to create reactance, thereby increas-
ing liking (Wright, Wadley, Danner, & Phillips, 1992).
Darwin (1871) noted the role of playing hard-to-get in
mating; he called it coyness. These disparate findings might
be integrated using evolutionary theory.
Research on playing hard-to-get has also been methodo-
logically limited. In some studies, only one sex was repre-
sented as targets or as participants (Walster et al., 1973;
Whitchurch et al., 2011). Also, previous research has only
examined participants’ likelihood of going out with prospec-
tive mates on one-on-one dates (Mathews et al., 1979; Scott,
2009; Walster et al., 1973), potentially obscuring the funda-
mental distinction of the duration of the mateship (Buss &
Schmitt, 1993). Updating the research on playing hard-to-
get with an evolutionary paradigm should include analyses
of sex differences and temporal context effects.
Supply-side economics
Economic models are commonly used in the examination of
mating psychology (Baumeister & Vohs, 2004; Kenrick,
Groth, Trost, & Sadalla, 1993; Li, Bailey, Kenrick, &
Linsenmeier, 2002; Li & Kenrick, 2006). In mating markets,
much is known about the ‘products’ (e.g., sexual access,
money) that are being exchanged in terms of what people
desire in their potential mates (Buss, 1989; Fletcher, Tither,
O’Loughlin, Friesen, & Overall, 2004) and what they offer
to them (Cameron, Oskamp, & Sparks, 1977; Campos, Otta,
& Siqueria, 2002). Less is known about mating strategies
such as playing hard-to-get. When a product is scarce or
difficult to obtain, people perceive it to be more valuable than
if it is readily available or easy to obtain (Brannon & Brock,
2001; Lynn, 1992; Snyder, 1992; Worchel, 1992). We con-
tend that playing hard-to-get may work through creating
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the impression of limited availability (i.e., scarcity) in poten-
tial mates’ minds, thereby increasing the demand for the
person playing hard-to-get. In as much as people’s percep-
tions dictate their actions and decisions, the perceived
availability of prospective mates should alter the demand that
people place on that mate.
Numerous lines of research converge on this point. For
instance, research on the sexual double standard suggests that
women who limit their availability by not having sex are
considered more desirable and rated more favourably by
men (Crawford & Popp, 2003). Research on the operational
sex ratio (i.e., the number of sexually reproducing females
to males) suggests that when one sex is in short supply,
sexual norms will gravitate toward those preferred by that
sex (Guttentag & Secord, 1983). Other research indicates that
being selective or playing hard-to-get in one’s dating life
may increase likability (e.g., Bailey & Garrou, 1983; Walster
et al., 1973; Wright & Contrada, 1986). Similarly, creating
uncertainty seems to increase likability of prospective mates
(Whitchurch et al., 2011). Finally, evidence from biology
suggests that female garter snakes (genus Thamnophis) avoid
male garter snakes to enhance their perceived mate quality
(Shine, Wall, Langkilde, & Mason, 2005). Collectively, this
research suggests that limited availability, created through
proximate mechanisms, increases people’s approach orienta-
tion toward prospective mates.
Current studies
Darwin’s (1871) idea about the role of playing hard-to-get
(i.e., being coy) has been largely neglected in both social
and evolutionary psychology. In contrast, most research on
sex differences in sexual psychology (Buss & Schmitt,
1993; Kenrick et al., 1993) stems from parental investment
theory (Trivers, 2007). This theory suggests that the sex that
bears the greater obligation to offspring is the more choosy
sex (females in most species) and will put the opposite sex
(usually males) through ‘tests’ for access. It seems to us that
playing hard-to-get might be one way that people—women
in particular—can test their prospective mate’s commitment
and to manipulate their prospective mates to obtain what—
or whom—they want. We contend that playing hard-to-get
is an individual difference that reflects such a mating
strategy.
Men and women both invest heavily in long-term rela-
tionships, and therefore, the sexes tend to want similar things
in their respective partners (Li et al., 2002). Both sexes want
a high-quality mate who is willing to commit (Buss &
Schmitt, 1993; Kenrick et al., 1993). Limited availability
may signal to prospective mates that a person has the follow-
ing characteristics: (i) embodies less of a risk for defecting
from the partnership; (ii) is less likely to cuckold (for men);
(iii) is unlikely to introduce sexually transmitted infections
to the couple; (iv) has fewer dangerous ex-partners; and (v)
has a better social reputation. Therefore, both sexes may
want partners who have limited availability (Study 3) and
should be willing to invest (i.e., time and money) more in
that mate (Study 4). But because the costs women pay for
having sex are insensitive to the duration of the mateship,
men’ availability should affect women’s decision making
similarly across short-term and long-term relationship con-
texts (Haselton & Buss, 2000). Specifically, women should
express a stronger preference for unavailable prospective
mates than men do. In contrast, when considering highly
unavailable others in one’s mating pool, people may find
them less appealing for any relationship duration. Therefore,
we predict an inverted-U function for people’s willingness to
date and have a serious romantic relationship with prospec-
tive mates who differ on availability, but we expect a nega-
tive, monotonic function for casual sex relationships as a
function of the prospective mate’s availability (Study 3).
Although both sexes are selective toward committed rela-
tionship partners, men and women differ in their preference
for short-term, casual sex partners. Because the costs women
pay for having sex are independent of mateship duration
(Buss & Schmitt, 1993), women should not be interested in
men who are highly available. A man who is highly available
in any duration is one who is likely to defect or to have other
partners, which may lead to his resources and investment
being shunted to other women. In contrast, because men have
reproductively benefited from engaging in short-term, sexual
relationships (Buss & Schmitt, 1993), men are likely to be
sensitive to cues for future sexual payoffs, especially immi-
nent ones. That is, men may have evolved to prefer indica-
tions of sexual exclusivity (e.g., chastity) in their long-term
mating partners but to prefer signs of easy, low-cost access
(e.g., promiscuity) in their short-term mates (Buss & Schmitt,
1993; Li & Kenrick, 2006). To facilitate access, men should
be interested in short-term mates who are highly available. In
contrast, women pay the costs of pregnancy and breastfeed-
ing in unwanted pregnancies (at least in ancestral condi-
tions); thus, women may still have an aversion to men who
are particularly available because this suggests they may flee
rather than invest (Study 3). Therefore, women may choose
men who have limited availability to minimize their risk of
abandonment.
Alternatively, womenmay play hard-to-get to minimize the
same risks. Playing hard-to-get may motivate interested men to
bid higher for women; it may also eliminate men who are likely
to have a ‘hit-and-run’ short-termmating strategy (Jonason, Li,
Webster, & Schmitt, 2009). Thus, we expect women to enact
acts designed to decrease their apparent supply more than
men do. Research on the sexual double standard suggests that
by having limited availability, women can increase their lik-
ability (Crawford & Popp, 2003). Limiting her availability
may act as a filtration mechanism, excluding those men who
are only interested in short-term mating. That is, by being less
available, a womanmay increase her perceived value and, thus,
induce men to bid higher by increasing their commitment and
investment in her. In contrast, men who limit their availability
may pay heavier costs than women will through the loss of
potential mating opportunities. Thus, we expect women to play
hard-to-get more than men (Study 1).
Despite the expected sex differences in who men and
women choose—and whether or not they play hard-to-get—
we expect men and women to play hard-to-get for the same
reasons. Both sexes can benefit from increasing the demand
their mates place in them. Because playing hard-to-get can
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increase demand in both sexes, the sexes should not differ
in why they do so (Study 2). However, what might afford
some individuals the chance to play hard-to-get over
others? We suggest that it is those who have high market
value. Just as we argued that women play hard-to-get because
they have relatively more market value than men do, we
would predict that people who have more mate value are ones
who can afford to limit their availability. People with more
value are likely to have other mating options and can afford
to play hard-to-get. Therefore, we predict that mate value will
be positively related to trying to increase demand in potential
mates (Study 2).
An implied aspect of playing hard-to-get is that people try
to influence the mating decisions of prospective mates. Peo-
ple may try to manipulate the market forces around them by
limiting their availability to increase the demand others have
for them. One personality measure that reflects interpersonal
manipulation is Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970).
Those who are high on Machiavellianism may play hard-to-
get to manipulate the demand surrounding them. Therefore,
we predict that scores on Machiavellianism will be positively
related to playing hard-to-get to increase demand (Study 2).
Moreover, we expect this Machiavellianism association to be
present when controlling for narcissism and psychopathy—
the other two traits of the Dark Triad (Jonason et al., 2009;
Paulhus & Williams, 2002).
Although we expect convergent evidence with mate
value and Machiavellianism to substantiate our claim that
playing hard-to-get is about affecting one’s mating market
forces, we expect sociosexuality—individual difference in
people’s attitudes, desires, and behaviours about casual
sex—to offer discriminating evidence. That is, we expect
individuals’ willingness to have casual sex to be unrelated
to playing hard-to-get to increase demand (Study 2). One
who is promiscuous may be unlikely to attempt to alter mar-
ket forces around them because of the potential risk involved
with playing hard-to-get. That is, if sex is a priority in these
people’s lives, then playing hard-to-get may actually reduce
their access to short-term sex. Although there might be
long-term benefits for playing hard-to-get (e.g., obtaining
higher-quality mates), people interested in casual sex do
not often sustain lasting relationships (Jonason et al., 2009).
In four studies, we examine individual differences in
playing hard-to-get through an adaptationist lens. In Studies
1 and 2, we describe the tactics, correlates, reasons, and po-
tential consequences of playing hard-to-get. In Studies 3
and 4, we manipulate how often prospective mates go on
dates with new people (i.e., an alternative conceptualization
of playing hard-to-get) and examine people’s interest in pro-
spective mates as romantic relationship and casual sex part-
ners and how much people will ‘pay’ (i.e., hours spent
helping study and money spent on dinner) for prospective
mates who vary in their availability.
STUDY 1
Playing hard-to-get is likely enacted through a range of dif-
ferent tactics, and these tactics should focus on creating the
impression of limited availability in prospective mates.
Therefore, we use the act nomination (Study 1a) and act fre-
quency (Study 1b) methods, which combine qualitative and
quantitative methods (Buss & Craik, 1983). This technique
has previously revealed playing hard-to-get as a mate attrac-
tion tactic but did not focus on any one tactic in detail (Buss,
1988; Fisher & Cox, 2010). We also expect women to use
the associated acts to play hard-to-get than men will.
Study 1a: nomination of tactics
Method
Participants were 100 undergraduate psychology students1
(60% women) at the El Paso Community College, Texas,
who received extra credit for participation. Fifty-six percent
of the sample was of Mexican descent, 40% was of European
descent, and the remainder was of some other racial classifi-
cation. Participants responded to a single, open-ended ques-
tion: ‘What behaviors do people perform when they “play
hard-to-get” with others in terms of romantic/sexual relation-
ships?’ They completed this question in a paper-and-pencil
format in a three-page document. Page 1 informed them of
the nature of the study. Page 2 provided them with space to
answer the question. Page 3 included the reported demo-
graphic questions and a debriefing.
Results and discussion
Three research assistants collated responses to the open-ended
question. Items that were similar on the basis of face validity
were eliminated. Responses that were unclear in meaning were
discussed among the three research assistants who came to a
consensus of what was meant (Bulmer, 1979), leaving 58 items
(Table 1). In short, items reflected decreasing availability and
minimizing contact as detailed later.
Study 1b: typicality of tactics
Method
Participants were 491 students (34%women) aged 18–45 years
(M=20.38, SD=3.89) from the New Mexico State University
who participated in exchange for partial course credit in their
psychology class. Ninety-four percent described themselves
as heterosexual, 3% as homosexual, and 3% as bisexual.2
Thirty-eight percent described themselves as single, and 62%
was involved in a serious romantic relationship (i.e., dating
or married). Fifty-two percent of the sample was of European
descent, 30% was of Mexican descent, 10% was of African
descent, and the remainder was of some other racial classification.
Participants were informed of the nature of the study and
completed a simple measure composed of three pages. Parti-
cipants were asked to rate how often (1 = not at all; 5 = very
much) they used each tactic gathered in Study 1a in the
context of playing hard-to-get in romantic or sexual relation-
ships. Next, participants were asked demographic questions.
Last, participants were thanked and debriefed.
1No comparisons were made by sexual orientation given the small sample.
2Results were invariant across sexual orientation, and thus, results were col-
lapsed across that distinction.
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Results and discussion
In Table 1, we report descriptive statistics for participants’
ratings of how often they perform the items revealed in Study
1a. The two most commonly committed tactics were ‘acting
confident’ and ‘talks to others’. Both may reflect the greater
perceived mate-value characteristic of those who might play
hard-to-get. In a multivariate ANOVA with all the tactics as
dependent variables, we found a significant, multivariate
sex difference [Wilk’s Λ= .61, F(58, 346) = 3.85, p< .01, 2p
= .39]. In Table 1, we denote the significant sex differences with
superscript letters. Overall, the sexes were more alike than
different in their use of the acts, but generally, when there were
differences, women committed the acts more than men did
(ts =1.96 to 8.43, ps< .05). For instance, women tended
‘not to call’, ‘not talk a lot’, and ‘stay busy’ more than men
did.Men used only three tactics more than women did (ts = 2.84
to 4.60, ps< .01): ‘acting snooty or rude’, ‘saying all the right
things but not calling’, and ‘treating others like s#@t’.
We envision playing hard-to-get as a strategy of tactics
that reflect a general factor designed to increase the percep-
tion of scarcity—or decrease the perception of availabil-
ity—of the user. We conducted a principal components
analysis with oblique rotation on the 58 self-reported items
asking participants how frequently they commit each playing
hard-to-get tactic. The scree plot suggested a single-factor
solution (eigenvalues for the first three factors = 13.91,
2.97, 2.46), and this factor accounted for 28% of the vari-
ance. To shorten the scale, we retained only those items that
loaded≥ .60 (Table 1). When we re-ran the principal compo-
nents analysis on the retained items, this single factor now
accounted for 50% of the variance (eigenvalue = 2.50). The
five retained items showed good internal consistency
(a = .75) for a scale composed of only five items (Carmines
& Zeller, 1979). Next, to verify this one-dimensional struc-
ture, we used confirmatory factor analysis. We used the five
items as indicators of a latent factor for playing hard-to-get.
This model (Figure 1) returned a fair fit (root mean square
error of approximation = .056, 95% confidence interval
[.03, .09], comparativefit index= .97, incrementalfit index= .97,
normed fit index= .94, p-closeness= .32, w2(10)=23.58, p< .01,
w2/df=2.36).
We collapsed the five items into a single index to find
that men (M = 2.78, SD= 0.88) played hard-to-get slightly
less (t(411) =1.64, Cohen’s d =0.17) than women did
(M = 2.94, SD= 0.95), suggesting that men and women do
not differ overall in their playing hard-to-get rates but only
differ in their adoption of certain tactics as noted earlier. This
is not surprising in light of the few sex differences at the
tactical level from earlier. This might also suggest that other
individual differences besides the sex of the participant are
important in understanding playing hard-to-get. We turn to
other individual differences in Study 2.
STUDY 2: REASONS TO PLAY HARD-TO-GET
Study 1 suggests that although playing hard-to-get may be
characterized by creating the impression of limited availability,
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, sex differences (denotedwith superscript
letters), and factor loadings of the frequency of commission of acts
associated with playing hard-to-get
M (SD)
Factor
loadings
Act confident 4.13 (1.13) 0.27
Talk to others 3.86 (1.23) 0.47
Withhold sex 3.71 (1.49)a 0.26
Act sarcastic but friendly 3.61 (1.37)a 0.34
Superficial conversation 3.59 (1.25) 0.41
Make others work to get them 3.57 (1.37)a 0.51
Give accidental physical contact 3.51 (1.36) 0.29
Be unpredictable 3.48 (1.29) 0.36
Keep conversation short 3.42 (1.24) 0.45
Make others chase 3.40 (1.38)a 0.57
Show attention to others 3.37 (1.25) 0.51
Act busier than you really are 3.25 (1.35) 0.57
Tease 3.24 (1.53)a 0.37
Look at you but then turn away 3.23 (1.33)a 0.30
Act like you are not attracted 3.18 (1.42) 0.46
Take time to respond 3.18 (1.23)a 0.48
Limit self-disclosure 3.15 (1.31) 0.49
Prioritize other things 3.14 (1.35) 0.51
Offer limited physical affection 3.14 (1.30)a 0.48
Sound busy 3.13 (1.34)a 0.61
Be responsive but slightly distant 3.10 (2.02) 0.38
Act like you do not care 3.10 (1.42) 0.56
Delay responding to calls 3.10 (1.37)a 0.53
Stay busy 3.10 (1.37)a 0.51
Give some attention then disappear 3.09 (1.34) 0.58
Delay responding to text messages 3.05 (1.41) 0.54
Do not call the next day 3.01 (1.51) 0.58
Have limited availability 3.01 (1.33)a 0.61
Be non-responsive to pick-up attempts 2.98 (1.39)a 0.49
Act uninterested 2.97 (1.31) 0.58
Play games 2.91 (1.45) 0.38
Flirt with others in plain sight 2.90 (1.46)a 0.50
Act non-committal 2.90 (1.41) 0.57
Remain at a distance 2.88 (1.24) 0.54
Appear unreachable 2.85 (1.37) 0.56
Be hard to get a hold of 2.85 (1.31) 0.62
Do not express many emotions 2.84 (1.36) 0.36
Show initial interest then it wanes 2.82 (1.26) 0.62
Ignore efforts to get her or his attention 2.77 (1.24) 0.59
Do not call 2.76 (1.47)a 0.59
Let the machine get the message 2.73 (1.42)a 0.58
Flirt but then stop suddenly 2.67 (1.38) 0.39
Seek attention but then disregard it 2.60 (1.34) 0.63
Offer limited witty conversation 2.57 (1.29) 0.43
Offer brief responses to questions 2.57 (1.24) 0.56
Do not talk a lot 2.54 (1.29)a 0.43
Act like you do not want to talk 2.54 (1.28) 0.58
Date others 2.51 (1.40) 0.38
Taunt 2.50 (1.44) 0.39
Feign disinterest 2.49 (1.21) 0.55
Turn down first few dates 2.48 (1.29)a 0.48
Do not give phone number 2.43 (1.40)a 0.48
String others along 2.41 (1.36) 0.51
Avoid contact 2.41 (1.27) 0.47
Say all the right things but do not call 2.38 (1.39)b 0.58
Cancel plans at the last minute 1.86 (1.22) 0.43
Be rude or snooty 1.50 (1.01)b 0.31
Treat others like s@#t 1.31 (0.83)b 0.25
Note: Values in bold are those items that have been retained after the first
principal components analysis.
aWomen scored higher than men.
bMen scored higher than women.
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it was inductive and only gives a vague and inferred idea
about why individuals might play hard-to-get. In contrast, in
Study 2, we generate our own measures as to why people play
hard-to-get with guidance from sexual economics and error
management theory (EMT; Haselton & Buss, 2000). Sexual
economics predicts that men and women might play hard-to-
get to increase demand. This may have been revealed in Study
1 with items concerned with creating the impression that one is
busy or has limited availability. In contrast, EMT predicts that
women might play hard-to-get to test commitment in mates
and to gain more information about them. EMT suggests that
recurrent patterns of errors in decision making regarding the
mating intentions of others may have selected for different
tendencies in men and women. Men tend to commit type I
errors (‘false alarm’); they often perceive women’s sexual
interest in them when none exists because men pay a heavier
cost for missed sexual opportunities than women. In contrast,
women tend to commit type II errors (‘miss’); they often fail
to see men’s commitment in them when it truly exists because
women pay a heavier parental investment cost from having sex
than men do. Such a motivation may have been alluded to in
Study 1 in the tactic of making others chase or work to get
them, an ostensible test of commitment.
In contrast, being currently unavailable because the
person is dating someone else and there is not a relationship
match should not characterize (conscious) reasons to play
hard-to-get well. The former denotes actual limited availabil-
ity not apparent limited availability (as revealed in Study 1).
Actual limited availability is likely an unattractive mate
quality; one probably does not want to waste her/his time with
someone who cannot reciprocate. Therefore, this should not be
a central reason to play hard-to-get. The latter reason simply
denotes a mate who one is not interested in. People should
not want to play hard-to-get towards a mate in which they are
not interested. Instead, people use playing hard-to-get towards
prospective mates that they are interested in, but it is performed
to manipulate the prospective mate to increase demand.
Accordingly, we predict that Machiavellianism will be corre-
lated with attempting to increase demand.
Method
Participants
Participants were 290 students (40%women) aged 18–55 years
(M=22.42, SD=6.15) from the University of West Florida
who participated in exchange for extra credit in their psychol-
ogy courses. Ninety-two percent described themselves as het-
erosexual, 3% as homosexual, and 5% as bisexual.3 Fifty-two
percent described themselves as single and 48% as involved
in a serious relationship (i.e., dating or married). Forty-seven
percent of the sample was of European descent, 22% was of
African descent, 17%was of Hispanic descent, and the remain-
der was of some other racial classification.
Procedures and measures
We created five indices to measure different reasons to play
hard-to-get. For each index, participants were asked how
much they agreed (1 = not at all; 5 = very much) with various
items asking how much each was a reason they played
hard-to-get. The five indices measured the following: (i)
motivation to increase demand (i.e., to make the person want
me more, to make the person desire me more, to make the
person ‘need’ me, to make the person more interested in
me; Cronbach’s a= .91); (ii) uncertainty (i.e., I am unsure
if I want to date the person, I have not made up my mind
about dating the person, I am on the fence about the person;
a= .94); (iii) currently dating others (i.e., I am seeing some-
one else, I am dating others, I am dating someone else, I am
more interested in someone else, I am trying to see whether
3Results were invariant across sexual orientation, and thus, results were
collapsed across that distinction.
.65 .65 .65 .63 .59
Playing hard-to-get
Sound busy Has limited 
availability
Show initial interest, 
then it wanes
Seeks attention, 
then disregards it
Be hard to 
get ahold of
Figure 1. Confirmatory factor analysis for a latent factor of playing hard-to-get. CFI, comparative fit index; CI, confidence interval; IFI, incremental fit index;
NFI, normed fit index; RMSEA, root mean square error of approximation.
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another relationship will go forward; a = .92); (iv) not think-
ing we match (i.e., I am not that into the person, the person
really does not ‘do it for me’, I do not think we are match;
a= .92); (v) testing partner’s willingness to commit (i.e., to
test their level of interest in me, to see if the person would
keep pursuing me, to test the person, to test the person’s will-
ingness to commit to me; a = .91).
The 22-item Mate Value Inventory was used (Kirsner,
Figueredo, & Jacobs, 2003). Participants indicated agree-
ment (1 = not at all; 7 = very much) with statements assessing
their self-reported mate value (e.g., I am a person with a good
sense of humour). Items were re-coded where necessary and
averaged into an index (a= .82).
The seven-item Sociosexuality Orientation Index was used
(Simpson &Gangestad, 1991). Participants responded to ques-
tions such as ‘I can imagine myself being comfortable and
enjoying casual sex with different partners’. Individual Socio-
sexuality Orientation Index items were standardized (z-scored)
prior to computing scale means and averaged (a = .76).
The 12-item Dark Triad Dirty Dozen measure was used
(Jonason & Webster, 2010). Participants were asked how
much they agreed (1 = not at all; 5 = very much) with state-
ments such as ‘I tend to want others to admire me’, ‘I tend
to lack remorse’, and ‘I have used deceit or lied to get my
way’. These items were averaged together to create an index
of narcissism (a= .82), Machiavellianism (a= .78), and
psychopathy (a= .71). The three traits were correlated with
one another (rs = .36–.61, ps< .01).
In a descriptive fashion, we also measured the Big Five.
The Ten-Item Personality Inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow, &
Swann, 2003), a measure that asks two questions for each
dimension of the Big Five, was used. Participants were asked,
for instance, how much (1= not at all; 5 = very much) they
think of themselves as ‘extraverted, enthusiastic’ and ‘quite,
reserved’ (reverse-scored) as measures of extraversion. Esti-
mates of internal consistency returned low rates: extraversion
(a = .65), agreeableness (a= .29), conscientiousness (a= .58),
emotional stability (a= .58), and openness (a = .33). Such rates
are expected for short scales (Kline, 2000).
Results and discussion
A mixed-model ANOVA with reasons (within subjects) and
participants’ sex (between subjects) revealed that the five
reasons significantly differed in their importance for why
people play hard-to-get [F(4, 263) =13.43, p< .01, 2p = .05]—
the motivation to increase demand (M=2.88, SD=1.18; con-
firming that playing hard-to-get is about sexual economics)
and testing commitment (M=2.85, SD=1.17; confirming
EMT) were equally the most important. Uncertainty
(M=2.71, SD=1.15) was lower than testing commitment.
Dating others (M=2.39, SD=1.21) and not a match
(M=2.46, SD=1.21) were the lowest. There were no sex
differences or interactions with participants’ sex, which limits
the utility of EMT because the effects should be localized to
women in reference to testing commitment.
In Table 2, we report correlations between the reasons to
play hard-to-get and personality measures. Given the large
number of tests, we reduced type I error by using p-values of
.001 and .0001. Higher self-perceived mate value was
associated with playing hard-to-get to increase demand and test
commitment. Narcissism andMachiavellianismwere correlated
with playing hard-to-get to increase demand, to test commit-
ment, and because one is dating others. When we controlled
for the shared variance among the Dark Triad trait, most of
the relationships became non-significant. The only case in
which they did not was for increasing demand as the motivation
to play hard-to-get. In this case, bothMachiavellianism (b= .26,
t=3.21, p< .01) and narcissism (b= .20, t=2.85, p< .05) but
not psychopathy (b=.10, t=1.45) accounted for the unique
variance (R2 = .14) in the underlying motivation to playing
hard-to-get to increase demand. This suggests that increasing
demandmight be part of beingmanipulative in mating contexts.
STUDY 3: DESIRABILITY AS A FUNCTION OF
AVAILABILITY
Prior research has manipulated availability by modulating how
often prospective mates go out on dates (Mathews et al., 1979;
Walster et al., 1973). We predicted the following: (i) a highly
available prospective mate would generally be desired for
casual sex relationships; (ii) a moderately available prospective
mate would generally be desired for a date and a serious
romantic relationship; (iii) men would have a preference for
highly available mates for a casual sex relationship; and (iv)
women should especially want a prospective mate who is
limited in his availability for a serious relationship.
Table 2. Correlations between reasons to play hard-to-get and personality measures in Study 2
Variables MVI SE SOI
Big Five Dark Triad
E A C N O M P N
Increase demand 0.22** 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.33** 0.12 0.33**
Test commitment 0.20* 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.20* 0.10 0.25**
Uncertainty 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.04
Dating others 0.14 0.02 0.18 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.19* 0.07 0.19*
Not a match 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.08
*p< .001,
**p< .0001.
Note: MVI, Mate Value Inventory; SE, self-esteem; SOI, sociosexuality; E, extraversion; A, agreeableness; N, neuroticism; O, openness; M, Machiavellianism;
P, psychopathy; N, narcissism.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 270 heterosexual students (65% women)
aged 18–35 years (M=19.66, SD=2.56) from the New
Mexico State University who participated in exchange for
course credit in their psychology courses. We collected limited
demographic information to attempt to maintain the cover story.
Fifty-four percent of the sample was of European descent, 34%
was of Mexican descent, 13% was of African descent, and the
remainder was of some other racial classification.
Procedure
Participants were solicited to partake in a study relating to
designing an online campus dating website. They were told
that the Psychology Department was asked to help the
designers of the system by checking to see if the computer
algorithm designed to match members actually matched the
ratings they, as participants, would provide. Therefore, they
were asked to provide some simple demographic information
(i.e., year in college, major, sex, age) and information regard-
ing their exercise/health behaviours (i.e., number of times per
week going to the gym, number of times per week going to
the bar, how often drinking alcohol per week) and dating
behaviour (i.e., how often one pays for a date’s meal, number
of times going out with friends per week, willingness to go
out with someone who they just met).
Next, participants were presented with three folders, each
marked with an A, B, or C on the front cover. They were told
that ‘these individuals were all pre-rated as attractive by other
students but we want to see how decisions are made without
the pictures’. In each folder was a profile of a prospective
mate who had presented the same information (age 19 or
20, a social science major of some kind) as the participants
had done so earlier. However, the information here was
manipulated in accordance with prior work (Mathews et al.,
1979; Walster et al., 1973) to create three prospective mates
who were essentially identical in all respects except the
degree to which the individual goes out with someone they
just met (1 = never; 2 = occasionally; 3 = often) and their sex
(each participant viewed opposite-sex profiles). Folder A
contained a highly available prospective mate who often
dated those he or she just met. Folder B contained a moder-
ately available mate who occasionally dated those she or he
just met. Folder C contained a highly unavailable mate who
never dated those he or she just met.
Accompanying the folders, a brief measure was given to
participants, in which they were instructed to refer to the
folders for their answers. Participants were asked three
forced-choice questions. They were asked to choose (with
replacement) one of the three folders for a date, a casual sex
partner, and a committed romantic relationship. Upon com-
pletion of these items, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results and discussion
First, we examined the choices participants made for the
three prospective mates for each of the three relationship
types. Figure 2 shows the percentages for which participants
chose the three prospective mates for each relationship type.
All three returned significant differences. For dating
(w2(2) = 103.47, p< .01) and committed romantic relation-
ships (w2(2) = 104.87, p< .01), the prospective mate who
was medium in availability was preferred. In contrast, the
highly available prospective mate was preferred for a casual
sex relationship (w2(2) = 54.07, p< .01).
Next, we compared which of the three prospective mates
the participants chose for each relationship type as a function
of participant’s sex. In Figure 3, we present the percentages
men and women chose the prospective mates for each
relationship type. Men and women did not differ in their
preferences for prospective mates for a date (Figure 3, top
panel; w2(2) = 2.99, Φ= .11). However, men preferred the
highly available prospective mate for a casual sex partner
more than women, whereas women preferred both the
medium-availability and low-availability prospective mates
for casual sex more than men (Figure 3, middle panel;
w2(2) = 12.63, p< .01, Φ = .22). Nevertheless, for both sexes,
the highly available prospective mate was preferred for
casual sex. Women preferred a prospective mate who was
medium in availability for committed romantic relationships,
whereas men preferred low-availability mates for committed
romantic relationships (Figure 3, bottom panel; w2(2) = 14.73,
p< .01, Φ= .23).
Importantly, results reveal the predicted the inverted-U
function in relationships of a more serious nature (i.e., dating
and serious romantic relationships) but the negative linear
function in the casual sex context. It may be that individuals
are unwilling to expend considerable effort for casual sex
partners given the low return rates of engaging in such a
relationship, whereas in relationships that are more serious,
individuals prioritize prospective mates who may embody the
proper mixture of mate value and availability. These functions
were further moderated by the sex of the participant, revealing
different priorities in men and women as a function of mating
duration and availability. This might imply that a viable reason
for previous studies reporting a lack of a playing hard-to-get
effect was an artefact of not consideringmating duration, asses-
sing only interest in going on a date with the prospective mate
(Scott, 2009; Walster et al., 1973).
Figure 2. Percent prospective mates chosen for different relationships
according to degree of availability (low, medium, high) in Study 3.
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STUDY 4: INCREASED VALUE AS A FUNCTION OF
AVAILABILITY
In a competitive market, when demand outstrips supply,
buyers should not only regard the underlying product as
more desirable but also be willing to pay a higher price to
obtain it. Accordingly, we ran Study 4 to see if participants
would be willing to spend more hypothetical time and money
for a potential mate who was less available than for one who
was more available. Again, we manipulate the perceived
availability of particular mates.
Method
Participants
Participants were 425 students (53%women) aged 18–50 years
(M=20.41, SD=3.93) from the University of South Alabama
who participated in exchange for extra credit in their psy-
chology course. The racial breakdown of the participants was
59% White, 25% Black, and some other racial category
for the remainder. Fifty-three percent of the sample was
single, and 47% was involved in a serious relationship
(including married). Ninety-four percent of the sample
was heterosexual, 4% was bisexual, and fewer than 2%
was homosexual.4
Measures and procedure
Participants completed a two-page survey that manipulated
the availability of a prospective mate as we did earlier in
Study 3 but in a between-subjects fashion (between 135
and 151 people randomly assigned to one of three levels
for availability). First, they read and signed an informed con-
sent. Second, they were given a black-and-white headshot
(six photos, in counterbalanced orders of presentation) of
an opposite-sex prospective mate who had been pre-rated
as physically attractive but varied on described availability.
The pictures were taken from a website where individuals
post pictures and others rate them on a scale of 1–10, with
10 being highly attractive. Attractive photos received a rating
of 9.5 or above, and the unattractive photos received a 6–7;
both had to have been rated by at least 100 people. The pic-
tures were chosen according to their ratings as they came up
in the rating process, whether they were headshots, and they
were not from the southeastern USA to remove potential
familiarity effects. Third, they were asked to choose what
kind of restaurant they would be willing to take this person
to [fast-food ($10), casual dining ($30), sushi ($50),
fine dining ($70)], to choose the maximum money (US$)
they would spend on the prospective mate for dinner, and
‘how much time, in hours, would you be willing to invest
in helping this person in order to go out with them’. Third,
participants reported demographic information as reported
previously. Last, participants were debriefed and thanked
for participation.
Results and discussion
In a 2 (male, female) 3 (low, medium, high availability)
ANOVA, we treated restaurant choice (by price) as a
dependent variable. Individuals were willing to take the
low-availability prospective mate (M= 30.53, SD = 9.22) to
more expensive restaurants than the medium-availability
(M = 23.33, SD= 12.16) or high-availability (M= 22.74,
SD = 11.62) prospective mate [F(2, 423) = 21.37, p< .01,
2p = .09], with no difference between the latter two. Men
(M=28.21, SD=12.03) were more willing [F(1, 423) =16.81,
p< .01, 2p = .04] to take the prospective mate, regardless of
their availability, to more expensive restaurants than women
were (M=23.45, SD=10.66). However, these two main
effects were moderated by an interaction [F(2, 423) = 3.29,
p< .05, 2p = .02; Figure 4]. Although the prospective mate
who was low on availability was the most desired and the
4Results were invariant across sexual orientation, and thus, results were col-
lapsed across that distinction.
Figure 3. Percent prospective mates chosen for different relationships
according to degree of availability (low, medium, high) and the sex of the
participant in Study 3.
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high-availability prospective mate was the least desired, the
sexes did not differ in the amount of money they were willing
to spend for dinner with the prospective mate. In contrast, men
were willing to spend significantly more money than women
were for a prospective mate who was medium in availability.
We repeated this analysis for the maximum number of
US dollars participants were willing to spend on dinner and
replicated the main effects for availability [F(2, 420) =
10.47, p< .01, 2p = .05] and the sex of the participant
[F(1, 410) = 45.59, p< .01, 2p = .10], but the interaction was
not significant. The high-availability, medium-availability,
and low-availability prospective mates were worth $33.10
(SD=20.64), $34.99 (SD=24.25), and $44.45 (SD=20.10),
respectively. Men would spend $38.85 (SD=22.78), $45.60
(SD=29.14), and $50.14 (SD=21.56) on high-availability,
medium-availability, and low-availability mates, respectively.
Womenwould spend $28.07 (SD=17.21), $27.19 (SD=16.10),
and $38.31 (SD=16.49) on high-availability , medium-
availability , and low-availability mates, respectively.
We then repeated this analysis for time (hours) one
would spend. There was a main effect for participants’ sex
[F(1, 417) = 7.43, p< .01, 2p = .02]. Men would spend
2.71 hours (SD=5.05), 2.48 hours (SD=3.11), and 3.56 hours
(SD=6.26) helping high-availability, medium-availability, and
low-availability mates, respectively. Women would spend
1.62 hours (SD=1.56), 1.74 hours (SD=1.75), and 2.36 hours
(SD=2.41) helping high-availability, medium-availability, and
low-availability mates, respectively. However, there was no
main effect for a prospective mate’s availability on hours
willing to invest or an interaction of sex and availability. We
thought that this might be a function of skew in the report of
hours willing to be spent (skewness=8.05, kurtosis=79.51).
Therefore, we replicated the analysis but used a log-transformed
version of hours invested. We found that individuals were wil-
ling to spend more time [F(2, 376) = 4.24, p< .05, 2p = .02]
helping the low-availability prospective mate (M=0.67, SD=
0.70) than the medium-availability (M=0.61, SD=0.75) or
high-availability (M=0.57, SD=0.65) prospective mates, with
no difference between the latter two.Men (M=0.80, SD=0.68)
were willing to spend more time [F(1, 376) = 12.23, p< .01, 2p
= .03] helping the low-availability female prospective mates
(M=0.67, SD=0.70) than women (M=0.55, SD=0.70) were
willing to help male prospective mates.
Overall, men spent less money on more available pro-
spective mates, suggesting that they allocate their resources
to mates who have less availability and ostensibly more
value in the market. Interestingly, women were willing to
spend the least amount of money on the medium-availability
mate. This might be because this is the kind of mate she ide-
ally wants. He is one who is limited in availability, denoting
his value, but he is not a wasted effort like the highly unavail-
able prospective mate. By spending less money on this mate,
she may be allowing him the opportunity to prove his interest
in her and, therefore, encourage the formation of a mutually
satisfactory pair bond. Women’s spending on the low-
availability and high-availability prospective mates may denote
frivolity in their choices; women might be willing to spend
money because they are interested in such mates for ‘fun’.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
For years, researchers have studied the mating strategy of
playing hard-to-get (Eastwick et al., 2007; Walster et al.,
1973; Whitchurch et al., 2011). They have provided explana-
tions of how playing hard-to-get might work but have had
more difficulty explaining why it works as it does. In the
present research, we have provided the first account of play-
ing hard-to-get using an evolutionary paradigm, specifically,
sexual economics. In so doing, we examined sex differences
and similarities, context-specific effects, and reasons to play
hard-to-get and identified tactics associated with playing
hard-to-get and personality correlates. We contend that play-
ing hard-to-get is a specific mating tactic that could relate to a
broader range of mating strategies (Buss, 1988) and is used
to differing degrees by different individuals as evidenced in
sex differences and personality correlates. Playing hard-to-
get may be one strategy that reflects the modulation of per-
ceptions of one’s availability to facilitate one’s more general
mating strategy of attempting to obtain the best mate with the
greatest commitment one can.
In Study 1, we showed that playing hard-to-get was char-
acterized by minimizing contact or appearing unavailable,
providing a much-needed definition of playing hard-to-get
(Scott, 2009). Consistent with our evolutionary-based predic-
tions, women enacted more tactics with the intent of playing
hard-to-get than men did. This could be because either
women are trying to learn more information about potential
mates or men pay a heavier cost in terms of lost sexual
opportunities by playing hard-to-get. Alternatively, it could
be an American or Western norm that men court women
and women should play hard-to-get. Future work will need
to assess the role of limited availability in non-American/
Western samples. Nevertheless, men and women were more
alike than different in enacting different tactics associated
with playing hard-to-get.
In Study 2, we examined the reasons individuals play
hard-to-get and how personality traits relate to those reasons.
The primary reasons people played hard-to-get related to
increasing demand, consistent with economic models and
Figure 4. Interaction of sex of the participant and availability (low,
medium, high) predicting the cost of restaurants participants were willing
to take prospective mates to in Study 4.
466 P. K. Jonason and N. P. Li
Copyright © 2012 European Association of Personality Psychology Eur. J. Pers. 27: 458–469 (2013)
DOI: 10.1002/per
uncertainty, which may be consistent with EMT, but the
sexes did not differ in their self-reported reasons to play
hard-to-get despite evidence that men and women have
somewhat different sexual psychologies (Buss & Schmitt,
1993; Kenrick et al., 1993; Li & Kenrick, 2006). We feel that
there is no reason to expect men and women to differ on the
reasons they limit their availability, but instead, they should
differ on how often they use such tactics as we found in
Study 1b. These tactics are used in the real world where their
behaviour can be constrained by other agents. Both sexes can
benefit from increasing their value in the market. More
demand may reduce paternity uncertainty, infidelity threats,
and other potential relationship problems. In addition, in
Study 2, we detailed personality correlates. Two in particular
stands out: people who were manipulative (i.e., Machiavellian)
and of greater value (i.e., self-reported mate value) played
hard-to-get to increase demand, which was the most face-valid
assessment of reasons to play hard-to-get predicted by sexual
economics. Increasing demand likely requires one to manipu-
late the market forces surrounding them but comes with the risk
of losing mating opportunities and thus these correlations.
Playing hard-to-get may be part of the exploitative mating
strategy enacted by those high on the Dark Triad (Jonason
et al., 2009) or the ‘game-playing’ or ludic love style that
characterizes those high in Machiavellianism (Jonason &
Kavanagh, 2010).
In Study 3, we showed evidence of a context-specific
inverted-U function and how participants’ sex moderated this
effect. Men desired a serious relationship partner who was
low on availability more than women did, but it was women
who desired the same mate for a casual sex partner more than
men did. This highlights the asymmetries in male and female
sexual psychologies that result from different levels of mini-
mum obligation to offspring (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Trivers,
1972). Because a woman risks more in her sexual relation-
ships than men do (i.e., pregnancy costs), she should want
a mate who has higher value and is unlikely to leave her sad-
dled with an offspring. Being a good investment as a mate
may be advertised through limited availability. This may also
be why popular press books teaching men the ‘pick-up arts’
advocate that they cultivate a hard-to-get persona so that
women will chase them (Louis & Copeland, 2007). Women
prefer a highly unavailable man for a casual sex relationship.
In contrast, because men have an interest in finding low-cost
sexual access (Kenrick et al., 1993), they prefer casual sex
partners who are highly available.
In Study 4, we showed that increased value was associ-
ated with limited supply. This could be consistent with
economic models because people were willing to ‘pay’ more
for less available mates. It could also be consistent with
another theory—reactance—which suggests that the depriva-
tion of a sexual option makes one want that option more
(Baumeister, Catanese, & Wallace, 2002; Brehm & Brehm,
1981; Wright et al., 1992). However, we feel that sexual eco-
nomics may be a better theory despite recent attempts to
revive reactance (Chadee, 2011) because sexual economics
does the following: (i) provides a priori reasons to make pre-
dictions; (ii) is linked to a set of strong assumptions offered
by evolutionary theory; and (iii) can account for effects of
reactance (e.g., forbidden fruit). That is, in Study 4, we did
not reveal the inverted-U function but, instead, revealed that
the more unavailable a person is, the more people are willing
to invest in them. The lack of the inverted U could be the
result of the following: (i) the between-subjects method
might not allow for relative comparisons among prospective
mates (Study 3); (ii) the inverted-U might be specific to
mating decisions and not expenditure; and (iii) the fact that
participants answered questions about how much time and
money they would spend might imply that they actually do
have a chance with the prospective mate. Disentangling these
issues deserves more attention.
Limitations and future directions
Although there are some strengths of our research, there is
room for improvement. First, we relied on simple methods
such as the person-perception and the dating-service para-
digms for logistical reasons. Second, because we relied on
undergraduate samples, our findings might not generalize to
broader populations. For example, college students may have
limited funds, suppressing our monetary results in Study 4.
Third, we used a series of brief measures in Study 2. Brief
measures can suffer from loss of content while measuring
heterogeneous constructs. Future work might also attempt
to understand who—in terms of individual differences—
plays hard-to-get.
Fourth, we failed to take into account mating duration in
Studies 1 and 2. Although we have no reason to predict
specific differences, it is possible that tactics for playing
hard-to-get differ as a function of mating duration. We felt
that altering mating dynamics through limiting availability
had a singular effect to increase demand, but it is also possi-
ble that the effect is more sophisticated than that. This might
account for the fair fit we found in our confirmatory factor
analysis and the limited evidence for sex differences in Study
1b, which itself needs further refinement and validity tests to
follow. Instead, we felt it more important to alter the tempo-
ral context in Studies 3 and 4 because, like in studies on mate
choice (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Li et al., 2002), people would
be making mating decisions across different contexts. Alter-
natively, we may have been too reliant on an overly sim-
plified concept of human sexual relationships (Buss &
Schmitt, 1993). There are other types of relationships that
do not fit well into the dichotomy of short- and long term
(Jonason, Valentine, & Li, 2012). Future work might also
examine how playing hard-to-get functions in various rela-
tionship contexts.
More work is needed to extend the role of supply-side
economics in mating dynamics. First, we have researched
only playing hard-to-get to make our case for the role of lim-
ited availability in mating dynamics. Future work could
directly test whether a mate who plays hard-to-get actually
has a competitive advantage in the mating market. Our
manipulation in Studies 3 and 4 has been used by playing
hard-to-get researchers, but it might only assess one’s interest
in a prospective mate’s sociosexuality. In addition, studies
with more sophisticated methods would be useful. For
example, researchers could have participants interact with a
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confederate who then gets the participants’ phone number
and has to call in 1 or 4 days, thereby varying availability
in an alternative way. Last, we only concerned ourselves
with perceived availability. In contrast, objective supply, like
the operational sex ratio, may be more easily or appropriately
modelled with classic supply-and-demand reasoning and
may actually have driven the evolution of mate perception
mechanisms. Future work might manipulate actual supply
and measure the resulting demand.
CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated how supply-side economics and
evolutionary psychology can help account for mating
dynamics and not just mate preferences. We showed how
limiting perceived availability has the following characteris-
tics: (i) is at the core of playing hard-to-get; (ii) is performed
more by women than men (although the reasons to do so do
not differ across the sexes); (iii) is heavily informed by
evolutionary and economic models of mating psychology;
(iv) is related to the mate value individuals have on the
market; and (v) is part of a ‘game-playing’ love style that
characterizes those high on Machiavellianism. It seems as
though your grandmother’s advice might be true: absence
may indeed make the heart grow fonder.
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